



THE QUALITY OF COORDINATION IN
NORWEGIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT: THE
IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION
ARRANGEMENTS AND STRUCTURAL, CULTURAL
AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

COCOPS Working Paper No. 14

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December 2013



EUROPEAN COMMISSION
European Research Area



Funded under Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities

About COCOPS

The COCOPS project (Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future) seeks to comparatively and quantitatively assess the impact of New Public Management-style reforms in European countries, drawing on a team of European public administration scholars from 11 universities in 10 countries. It will analyse the impact of reforms in public management and public services that address citizens' service needs and social cohesion in Europe. Evaluating the extent and consequences of NPM's alleged fragmenting tendencies and the resulting need for coordination is a key part of assessing these impacts. It is funded under the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme as a Small or Medium-Scale Focused Research Project (2011-2014).

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Paper presented at the EGPA Study Group on Governance of Public Sector Organizations on "Compounded government organization, coordination and accountability in the face of global societal challenges". Conference of the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA) 11–13 September 2013, Edinburgh, Scotland

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 266887 (Project COCOPS), Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities

ISSN 2211-2006

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Abstract

This paper addresses the quality of coordination in Norwegian central government as perceived by top civil servants. We study both perceptions of horizontal and vertical coordination and perceptions of policy coherence and coordination. We examine how various coordination reforms and arrangements have changed these perceptions and what role structural, cultural and demographic features play. The empirical basis of the analysis is a survey of administrative executives in Norwegian ministries and central agencies conducted in 2012. While these executives tend to evaluate vertical coordination in their own policy area as pretty good, they identify problems with other types of coordination—specifically horizontal coordination across policy areas, downward coordination with the local and regional levels, upward coordination with the international level, and lateral coordination with stakeholders in the private and voluntary sectors. Perceptions of how well coordination works depend to a large degree on the coordination reform tools used and on structural features. The most important explanatory factors seem to be the administrative level of the respondent and how he or she perceives the impact of collaboration and cooperation reforms.

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1. Introduction

The New Public Management (NPM) movement was mainly characterized by a strategy of fragmentation (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) achieved via disaggregation and separating policy-making from management. Vertical specialization or structural devolution seems, however, to have undermined political control, for it has both weakened the structural levers of control and diminished the actual influence of political executives over subordinate levels and institutions. At the same time, increased horizontal specialization, according to the principle of “single-purpose organizations”, has created challenges for capacity and coordination (Gregory 2003). NPM, however, not only furthered fragmentation, but also promoted a number of reregulation measures, such as strengthening the internal instruments of control (Management-by-Objectives and Results), increasing the use of regulatory agencies and strengthening scrutiny and auditing in various ways (Christensen and Lægreid 2006a, Pollitt et al. 1999, Reichborn-Kjennerud 2013).

Our paper addresses the quality of coordination in Norwegian central government, as perceived by top civil servants. Post-NPM reform efforts have sought to address vertical and horizontal coordination problems by renewing the focus on programs such as “whole-of-government” and “joined-up government” (Peters 2006, Christensen and Lægreid 2006b, 2007a and b, Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest 2010). On the vertical dimension, allocating more central resources to subordinate institutions and levels and using stronger instruments of central control have become increasingly important ways for political executives to regain political control and pursue consistent policies across levels. On the horizontal dimension, measures like cross-sectoral bodies, programs or projects are increasingly being used to modify the “silozation” or “pillarization” of the central public administration (Gregory 2003, Pollitt 2003). Added to this, a stronger trend towards internationalization and regionalization combined with strong local government has increased the coordination challenges related to multi-level government tasks.

In this paper we study both perceptions of horizontal and vertical coordination and perceptions of policy coherence. We examine how various coordination reforms and arrangements have changed these perceptions and what role structural, cultural and demographic features play. The main research questions are: How have top civil servants experienced the main aspects of coordination: horizontal and vertical coordination and policy coherence? How can variations in the experience of coordination along the different dimensions be explained? What is the relative importance of different coordination mechanisms and of different structural, demographic and cultural variables for explaining these variations?

Our hypotheses are drawn from a broad transformative approach (Christensen and Læg Reid 2007a). The main dependent variables consider the *civil servants' assessment of the quality of coordination* along the following six dimensions: (1) vertical coordination within own policy area; (2) horizontal coordination between different government policy areas or sectors; (3) coordination with local and regional government; (4) coordination with supra-national and multinational organizations; (5) coordination with civil society organizations and private-sector interest organizations; and finally (6) the improvement of policy coherence and coordination.

The empirical basis of the analysis is a survey of administrative executives in Norwegian ministries and central agencies conducted in 2012 as part of a larger European survey under the auspices of the COCOPS research project (Coordination for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future) (Hammerschmid, Oprisor and Stimac 2013).

The paper first gives a brief account of coordination in the Norwegian context and portrays the main features of coordinative reform efforts internationally. Secondly, we present central concepts and theoretical perspectives. Thirdly, we outline our data sources. Fourthly, we describe the dependent variables and the coordination reforms and tools in Norway. Fifth, we analyse differences in perceived coordination. Finally, we discuss the findings in relation to our explanatory perspectives and draw some conclusions.

2. Coordination context in Norway

As a country with a large, universal welfare state, Norway has a large public sector and there is a relatively high level of mutual trust between central actors and public-sector organizations (Christensen and Læg Reid 2002). The financial situation in Norway is good, mainly due to oil and natural gas revenues and it has not been significantly affected by the post-2008 financial crisis in Europe. Norway is a unitary state with a combination of political and administrative decentralization. The principle of local self-government is quite strong. There are elected bodies at both local and regional level and these are expected to make their own local policies without too much interference from central government. At the same time, they have to implement policies coming from central government. The delivery of the most important welfare services is delegated to the municipalities. There are also government bodies at both the local and regional level that are responsible for implementing central government policies and with control and regulatory tasks.

The central government in Norway is characterized by strong sectoral ministries and relatively weak super-ministries with coordination responsibilities across ministerial areas. The principle of ministerial responsibility is strong. Each individual minister is responsible for all activities in his or her portfolio and in subordinate agencies and bodies. The only ministry with strong horizontal coordination power is the Ministry of Finance, although this is mainly restricted to questions of budget and financial

resources. The Prime Minister's Office has traditionally been rather small and it has not been a strong coordination body. Nevertheless, it has become more important over the past decade, owing to an increase in personnel and the existence of a majority government from 2005. In 2009, a special minister of coordination was appointed within the Prime Minister's Office. In addition, some ministries, such as the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Government Administration and Reform, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do have some coordination tasks across ministerial areas, and there is a long tradition of establishing interorganizational working and project groups to handle issues that straddle ministerial boundaries (Christensen et al. 2012).

Norway also has a well-developed system of integrated participation in policy-making, from stakeholders in society to an institutionalized corporative system. Representation of various interest organizations and voluntary organizations in government policy-making has a long tradition (Olsen 1983, Rokkan et al. 1970).

Over the past decade, developments in Norwegian central government have affected patterns of coordination. First, the NPM reforms have increased vertical and horizontal specialization while at the same time trying to balance this with a focus on vertical coordination mainly within the government apparatus, but also between the state and local government. Management-by-Objectives-and-Results has mainly addressed how superior authorities can control their subordinate agencies and bodies via different forms of performance-management techniques and quasi-contractual arrangements (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2008). This is also linked to structural devolution efforts that have turned public administration bodies into state-owned companies and given central agencies enhanced autonomy (Lægreid and Roness 2013). The problems of horizontal coordination have not been addressed to the same extent. This does not, however, mean that this is not an important problem in the Norwegian political-administrative system. The influence of the EU on national vertical structural devolution is also part of this complex equation. Central agencies are to a greater extent becoming 'double hatted' being responsible both to their domestic parent ministry and to EU bodies (Egeberg 2006), and the development of transnational expert networks has challenged domestic coordination patterns (Danielsen 2013). Norway's increased integration in the European Union through the Economic Area Agreement has enhanced the need for horizontal coordination and for a unified Norwegian position to be formulated on various policy issues (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004). To facilitate this, eighteen special overarching committees have been established, covering both ministries and agencies and different policy sectors. The members of these committees are civil servants in the ministries and agencies involved. In addition to these special committees there is also a coordination committee headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Norwegian case illustrates that a number of changes in government have made coordination more difficult and that there is an increasing demand for both horizontal and multi-level coordination (Peters 1998 and 2004). This contextual situation illustrates the special challenges that civil servants in Norwegian ministries and central agencies face when dealing with and assessing coordination. Even in Norway, with corporate pluralist structures and networks surrounding the ministries, coordination is often identified as a significant administrative issue (Peters 2006).

3. Features of coordinative reform efforts

The main goal of post-NPM reforms has been to counter the disintegration or fragmentation brought about under NPM by introducing more integration and coordination to the public sector (Peters 2006, Christensen and Lægreid 2007a). First, as indicated, fragmentation under NPM increased pressure for more horizontal integration and coordination. Societal problems can seldom be compartmentalized along sectoral lines, so increasing cross-sectoral coordinative capacity is important. Second, political executives have been reluctant to accept that NPM led to an undermining of political control. Many political executives have identified a situation where they are losing control, influence and information, yet still being held accountable, as problematic. This has resulted in efforts to strengthen central capacity and control (Dahlstrøm, Pierre and Peters 2011), particularly in sectors that are seen as politically salient. There is an increasing striving for coordination and coherence in public policy, and one answer seems to be a return to the centre (Peters 2005).

Third, confronted with an increasingly insecure world, whether as a result of terrorism, biosecurity concerns, tsunamis or pandemics, national states are seeking to strengthen central political control, but also see an increasing need for contingent coordination and network approaches (Christensen and Painter 2004, Kettl 2003, Wise 2002). Fourth, the promise that NPM would bring an overall increase in efficiency has been difficult to fulfil, even though some, more technically oriented services have become more efficient. Concerns have been raised about the possibly negative effects of certain NPM features, such as increased social inequality and the declining quality of public services (Stephens 1996).

Attempts to coordinate government policy-making and service delivery across organizational boundaries are not a new phenomenon (Ling 2002, Kavangh and Richards 2001). However, a second generation of reforms initially labelled “joined-up government” (JUG) and later known as “whole-of-government” has been launched, much in contrast to the NPM reforms. Its advocates describe it as a more holistic strategy, using insights from the other social sciences, rather than just economics (Bogdanor 2005). These new reform efforts, as a response to increased fragmentation, started in the late 1990s in the most radical NPM countries such as the UK, New Zealand and Australia (Perry 6 2004). The slogans “joined-up-government” and “whole-of-government” provided new labels for the old doctrine of coordination in the study of public administration (Hood 2005). In addition to the issue

of coordination, the problem of integration was a main concern behind these reform initiatives (Mulgan 2005).

The concept of JUG was first introduced by the Blair government in 1997, and a main aim was to get a better grip on the “wicked” issues straddling the boundaries of public-sector organizations, administrative levels and policy areas. It became one of the principal themes in the modernization program of Blair’s New Labour administration (Richards and Smith 2006). JUG was presented as the opposite of “departmentalism,” tunnel vision and “vertical silos”. In the UK, JUG has found its strongest expression at the local level, where it encourages various kinds of partnerships (Stoker 2005). Another special focus of JUG activities has been the assertion of authority in the form of special coordinators and clearance systems. It is, however, not entirely clear what JUG means (Pollitt 2003). The terms “joined-up-government” and “whole-of-government” have emerged as fashionable slogans rather than precise scientific concepts, and in practice they are often used more or less synonymously.¹

Some common features can be identified. The phrase JUG denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontal and vertical coordination in order to eliminate situations in which different policies undermine each other, to make better use of scarce resources, to create synergies by bringing together different stakeholders in a particular policy area and to offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to services (Pollitt 2003). The overlap with the whole-of-government concept is obvious. The *Connecting Government Report* (Management Advisory Committee 2004) defines whole-of-government in the Australian Public Service in this way: “Whole-of-government denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal or informal. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery”.

The scope of whole-of-government is pretty broad. One can distinguish between policymaking and *implementation* aspects, between *horizontal linkages* and *vertical linkages*, and the targets for whole-of-government initiatives can be a group, a locality or a policy sector (see Pollitt 2003). Whole-of-government activities may span any or all levels of government and also involve groups outside government. It is about joining up at the top, but also about joining up at the base and enhancing local level integration, and it involves public-private partnerships.

One example of a whole-of-government initiative in Norway is the reform of the employment and welfare administration (the NAV reform). In 2005 the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) decided to merge the employment and national insurance administrations and to establish a more formal

¹ There are also numerous other terms describing the challenge of improving coordination across policy sectors and service delivery, such as networked government, holistic government, connected government, cross-cutting policy, horizontal management, partnerships and collaborative public management.

collaboration with the local government social services administration. This comprehensive reform affects vertical sector coordination and horizontal coordination, as well as coordination between local and central government (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007, 2013).

4. Central concepts and analytical framework

Coordination

The COCOPS executive survey asked top level civil servants to assess the impact of NPM-style public sector management and emerging governance practices (Hammerschmid et al. 2013). One of the central questions concerned coordination quality, assessed on a seven-point scale from “very poor” to “very good”:

“How would you characterize the coordination in your own policy field, along the following dimensions?”

- *National government bodies within the same policy area*
- *National government bodies from different policy areas*
- *National and local/regional government bodies*
- *National and supra-national bodies/international organizations*
- *Government bodies and private and voluntary sector stakeholders”*

A second important question concerned the performance of public administration: *“Thinking about your policy area over the last five years, how would you rate the way public administration has performed on the following dimensions?”* One of the dimensions interesting for our purposes was *“policy coherence and coordination”*, assessed on a seven-point scale from *“deteriorated significantly”* to *“improved significantly”*. The first question entails drawing a distinction between an *external-internal* and a *vertical-horizontal* dimension of coordination (Christensen and Lægreid 2008) (Table 1). The external-internal dimension distinguishes between coordination within the central government, and between central government bodies and organizations outside the central government. The second dimension distinguishes between *vertical and horizontal* coordination. Vertical coordination concerns coordination within the central government, or coordination upwards to international organizations or downwards to local government. *Horizontal coordination* concerns coordination between organizations at the same level. Thus, we address the problem of coordination in a multi-level system. Normally, the vertical dimension of coordination is more hierarchy-based, while horizontal coordination is more network-based (Verhoest et al. 2005).

Table 1: Different inter-organizational coordination dimensions.

	<i>Horizontal coordination</i>	<i>Vertical coordination</i>
<i>Internal coordination within central government</i>	Coordination between ministries, agencies or policy sectors	Coordination between parent ministry and subordinate agencies and bodies
<i>External coordination across level of government/public private sector</i>	Coordination with civil society organizations/private-sector interest organizations	Coordination a) upwards to international organizations or b) downwards to local/regional government

If we take the central public administration as the unit of analysis, *vertical internal organizational coordination* means central efforts by political and administrative leaders to strengthen the coordination and control of subordinate levels/units in the central civil service, such as agencies. When vertical coordination is strong, we presuppose that the authority of political and administrative leaders is also strong. In the survey, this variable is labelled “vertical coordination within own policy area”. *Horizontal internal organizational coordination* implies coordination inside central government, among ministries and agencies. The Cabinet and the PM and his/her office are central actors, and this type of coordination is strong when their authority is strong. In our dataset, this variable is labelled “horizontal coordination between different government policy areas and sectors”.

Vertical inter-organizational coordination denotes coordination between the central administrative level and other geographical levels. In this type both sectoral political and especially administrative leaders are important actors, but their authority is restrained, since central control must be balanced against regional and local autonomy and also against supranational autonomy. In our dataset this dimension covers both downwards coordination with “local and regional government” and upwards coordination with “supra-national bodies/international organizations”.

Horizontal inter-organizational coordination concerns coordination between the state and organized interests. The central actors are sectoral political and administrative leaders and their counterparts in the private and voluntary sectors. We assume that the governmental actors’ authority is tempered by the relative strength of private and voluntary actors. In our dataset this variable is called “coordination with civil society organizations and private-sector interest organizations”.


In addition to these five dependent variables we adopt a general indicator of coordination quality by focusing on the above-mentioned question concerning the perception of performance in relation to policy coherence and coordination.

Analytical framework

Our theoretical approach applies multi-factor explanations for coordination quality. We use four perspectives and four corresponding clusters of independent variables to examine variations in the perception of coordination in the Norwegian central civil service (Christensen and Læg Reid 2010). Our analytical framework is illustrated in Figure 1.

The first is the *coordination reform perspective*. It starts from the notion that there is a connection between the organization's use of coordination tools and the perceived quality of coordination in the civil service, that is, the profile of the coordination tools is expected to influence the coordination quality effect profile. Structurally, different reform waves will entail using different coordinating tools and will therefore also influence the effects of coordination measures in different ways, because the structural context they operate in will change.

Figure 1: Main analytical framework



Abbreviations:
 IHC: Internal horizontal coordination
 IVC: Internal vertical coordination
 EVC: External vertical coordination
 EHC: External horizontal coordination

What relationship can we expect between different coordinating tools and perceived effects? The main thought is that it will vary according to how relevant the tools are for different civil servants. A general expectation is that the more important collaboration and cooperation reforms are, the higher the evaluation of coordination quality (H1). We expect that civil servants who score high on the use of hierarchical mechanisms and lead agency approach will also score high on vertical coordination (H2). We will also expect civil servants who score high on the use of cross-cutting groups, and programs to evaluate the quality of horizontal coordination as high (H3).

The second perspective is a *structural perspective* (Christensen et al. 2007; Egeberg 2012; Simon 1957). The point of departure is that the structural context of civil servants will influence how they think, how they perceive coordination effects and how they act, regardless of whether they use different coordinating mechanisms or not in their daily work. The first variable, *the administrative level*, separates civil servants working in ministries and those working in subordinate agencies. We will expect civil servants in central agencies to score higher on perceived effects related to users and clients since they are closer to them (H4). On the other hand, we will expect civil servants working in ministries to see stronger effects on vertical political/administrative control and coordination, since they are situated at a higher hierarchical level (H5) (Egeberg and Trondal 2011).

The second structural variable is *formal position* in the civil service hierarchy. Leaders have a greater obligation to organize and further coordination, and they are therefore likely to see coordination differently to executive officers lower down the hierarchy (Christensen and Læg Reid 2008b). This leads to a general expectation that leaders will score highest in their evaluation of a broad range of coordination forms, and also have a relatively high score on particularly demanding types of coordination (H6). The assumption here is that the hierarchical level at which civil servants work will change their perceptions of coordination effects. We will expect top administrative executives to see more impact on vertical coordination, and managers to score higher on implications related to users and clients, again based on proximity (H7).

Our perspective offers insights into variations in how coordination is experienced subjectively in different policy areas and among officials performing different tasks. The formal features will determine how internally or externally directed their work is, how technical or non-technical their tasks are, the number and type of stakeholders, etc. Thus, the third structural variable used is *policy area*. We distinguish between highly ‘wicked’ problem areas such as environment, health and labour/employment and problem areas that are less ‘wicked’. We will expect civil servants working in highly ‘wicked’ areas to have a stronger focus on horizontal coordination (H8). Regarding organizational size we will expect executives in small organizations to face fewer coordination problems than those working in larger organizations (H9).

We also apply a *cultural perspective*, which emphasizes the historical and institutional traditions of political-administrative systems (Selznick 1957). This perspective views the development of a public organization as based on historical traditions, path-dependency and informal norms and values (Krasner 1988, March 1994). It assumes that the leadership of a public organization will have a central role in socializing and training employees to make them act in an appropriate way. A “logic of appropriateness” is a central feature of the cultural perspective (March and Olsen 1989). The assumption is that what is appropriate for a civil servant to do is defined by the institution to which he or she belongs and is transmitted through socialization.

Common norms and values and a common culture may facilitate coordination.² A central challenge for leaders under the post-NPM reforms is to bring public organizations back together again. A new resolution is to create a common cultural platform that could yield a stronger collective capacity instead of primarily thinking about the interest and culture of each single public organization. In this perspective, informal norms, identities and the logic of appropriateness can be important explanatory factors for perceptions of coordination quality. Administrative traditions represent “filters” producing different outcomes in different contexts (Olsen, 1992). As a proxy for administrative culture, we use two variable measuring civil servants’ role identities. The relevant variables in our case is identification with the statement “getting public organizations to work together” and “fining joint solutions to solve problems of public concern”. Generally we will expect that those who identify with this statement will rate the quality of horizontal coordination higher (H10).

Finally, we apply a *demographic perspective* (Pfeffer 1983). The focus here is on where public officials come from and what norms, values and competence they bring with them into the ministries and central agencies (Lægreid and Olsen 1978). The general reasoning here is that civil servants through their socio-economic background or their individual careers have acquired certain norms and values that are relevant for their jobs. This may be related to early socialization such as social background, or late socialization related to experiences gathered during their education or career in the civil service. If their background is relevant to how they think and act, it will influence how they perceive coordination quality. We examine whether such differences systematically lead to variations in their assessment of coordination quality.

The first variable within this perspective is *age*. Because older civil servants have less experience with coordination challenges than younger workers, we will expect older civil servants overall to see fewer coordination problems than younger ones (H11). The second demographic variable is job or *employment tenure*, which reflects the experience of different positions and tasks civil servants gather at different stages in an administrative career (Christensen and Lægreid 2009). We will expect the

² This is very much reflected in the concept of “value-based management”, which is a central feature of the post-NPM reforms in Australia (Halligan 2007).

same type of pattern as for age – that is, the longer the employment tenure, the fewer perceived effects (H12).³ The third demographic variable is *gender*. We would generally expect men to see more positive coordination quality than women (H13). A reason for this is that men more often have leadership positions. We will expect women to score higher on perceived effects on services, transparency, and participation, partly because they are generally overrepresented at lower hierarchical levels.

The final demographic variable is *education*. It is well known that the professional background of civil servants has an impact on their perceptions as well as on their decision-making (Egeberg 2012, Christensen and Læg Reid 2009). Different educational groups may have different norms and competence or technical skills, and will have different positions and tasks in the civil service. We distinguish between three different educational backgrounds – jurists, social scientists and economists. We hypothesize that social scientists and economists will score the highest on the perceived effects of coordination, partly because of their educational background and partly because of the tasks and positions they have in the civil service (H14). Jurists are the traditional profession in central government. We will expect them to tend to see fewer overall effects of coordination than other professions, partly because they are more sceptical towards renewal and reform tools, as shown in other studies of NPM (Christensen & Læg Reid 1998) (H15). Generally we will also expect jurists to be more preoccupied with vertical hierarchical coordination.

5. The data

The Norwegian part of the COCOPS survey included respondents from the top three administrative levels within 17 Norwegian ministries (Læg Reid, Nordø and Rykkja 2013). At the agency level, all state agencies listed as central administrative bodies were included (62 bodies). In this case, state agencies were characterized as semi-autonomous organizations without legal independence but with some managerial autonomy (van Thiel 2012). At agency level, respondents from the top two administrative levels were included (Læg Reid, Nordø and Rykkja 2013).

The employment sector included respondents from the top two administrative levels within the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) at central level. The sample also included all respondents from the top administrative level within 19 County units of the NAV (NAV Fylke) and directors of NAV Special Units. The health sector included respondents from the top two administrative levels in central government. Here, respondents from the top two levels of four regional health enterprises in Norway were included in order to get a balance of respondents from both the employment and the health sector. Nineteen County medical officers were also included.

³ These expectations may, however, be weakened by a reversed effect: since older executives and executives with longer tenure have been more exposed to coordination challenges they may perceive more coordination problems.

Based on previous positive experience, and in view of limited time and resources, an access strategy based solely on e-mail invitations was chosen. Respondents were sent an invitation by e-mail with a link to the electronic web survey. The original e-mail invitations were distributed in June 2012. Two reminders were sent out during the following weeks. The questionnaire was resent to respondents from NAV in September 2012, with two reminders in the weeks following. In the end, no postal questionnaires were returned.

Overall, a total of 1299 invitations were sent out: 1055 to central government executives, 155 to health sector executives, and 89 to executives in the employment sector. In total, the survey received 436 answers, which denotes an overall response rate of 34 percent.

6. The dependent variables – Coordination quality

We now move on to describe how public servants evaluate the coordination quality between different levels and sectors in Norway. It is interesting that close to 20% of Norwegian executives stated that they could not assess coordination with national and local/regional bodies and national and supra-national bodies/international organizations. This probably reflects the fact that many of the executives have internally directed roles and tasks and little experience with different types of coordination. In our sample 75% of the respondents came from the third-highest level in the hierarchy, while the rest were top civil servants (Christensen and Læg Reid 2008). The respondents who answered gave the highest ratings to coordination in national government bodies in the same policy area (Table 2). For the four remaining variables – government bodies and private and voluntary stakeholders, national and supra-national bodies, national and local/regional government bodies and national government bodies from different policy areas, the distribution across the scale is rather similar: Just under 30% evaluated coordination between bodies within their own policy field as more or less poor, whereas around 20% were neutral, and around 30% perceived coordination as more or less good. The overall picture tells us that coordination is not considered to be particularly good, and this experience seems to be strongest in relation to bodies from different policy areas.

Table 2: Administrative executives' characterization of coordination within their own policy field. 2012. Percentages.

Coordination with:	Poor	Neither poor nor good	Good	N
National government bodies within the same policy area	14	26	60	408
National government bodies from different policy areas	31	32	37	385
Local and regional government bodies	34	30	36	332
Supra-national bodies/international organizations	30	28	42	344

Private and voluntary sector stakeholders	32	28	41	374
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Note: All variables range from 1 to 7 where 1 means ‘very poor’ and 7 means ‘very good’. In this table ‘Poor’ denotes response from 1 to 3, ‘Neither poor nor good’ is 4 and ‘Good’ is 5-7. ‘Do not know’ is excluded from the table.

Despite their mixed experience of coordination with the different institutions, Norwegian public sector executives assess coordination more favourably than their colleagues in other European countries (Lægneid, Nordø and Rykkja 2013). This applies especially to coordination between national government bodies within the same policy area (60% of Norwegian respondents evaluate this as rather good, compared to only 49% of other European respondents). Yet, the European sample evaluates coordination with government bodies and private and voluntary sector stakeholders as better (48% rather good vs. 35% in the Norwegian sample). The same is the case for coordination with national and local/regional government bodies (40% rather good vs. 29% in the Norwegian sample).

The top civil servants reported a rather mixed pattern regarding the overall improvement in policy coherence and coordination on this dimension. Only 42% saw improvements and 20% reported deterioration (Table 2). In fact, this is one of the dimensions where deterioration is most clearly perceived in Norway, although compared to other countries the deterioration in Norway is significantly lower (Lægneid, Nordø and Rykkja 2013).

Table 3: Administrative executives’ rating of the way public administration has performed over the past five years on policy coherence and coordination. 2012. Percentages.

Deteriorated	20
Stable	39
Improved	42
N	380

Note: The variable ranges from 1 to 7 where 1 means ‘Deteriorated significantly’ and 7 means ‘Improved significantly’. In this table ‘Deteriorated’ denotes scores of 1-3, ‘Stable’ is 4 and ‘Improved’ is 5-7. ‘Do not know’ is excluded from the table.

Generally, these six dimensions of coordination are more complementary and supplementary than alternative dimensions (see Appendix Table 4). There is a significant positive correlation between all dimensions, ranging from .17 to .57. (Pearson’s R). The strongest correlation is between horizontal and vertical coordination. If executives perceive coordination along one dimension as good, they also

tend to assess coordination along other dimensions as good. Thus internal coordination problems tend to go hand in hand with external coordination problems, and vertical coordination challenges are connected to horizontal coordination issues. Also the rating of policy coherence and coordination performance varies significantly positively with coordination along the five different dimensions. This means that the different dimensions of coordination are not mutually independent categories but there is quite a lot of overlap between them (see also Christensen and Læg Reid 2008b).

7. Coordination reforms and tools

When experiencing coordination problems with other organizations, Norwegian top civil servants are most likely either to refer the issues upwards in the hierarchy (55% tend to agree⁴) or set up cross-cutting work or project groups (53% tend to agree) (Læg Reid, Nordø and Rykkja 2013). This is in line with the long tradition of using cross-cutting collegial bodies in the Norwegian ministries (Christensen et al. 2012). However, it is not very common to set up cross-cutting policy arrangements or programs (55% tend to disagree), to decide on lead organization (60% disagree) or more permanent special-purpose bodies (76% tend to disagree). Referring issues upwards in the hierarchy is an even more preferred strategy in other European countries where 67% tend to agree.

In general, collaboration and cooperation among different public-sector actors is assessed as an important reform trend within their own policy area by more than 70% of the administrative executives in Norway (Læg Reid, Nordø and Rykkja 2013). In fact, among 15 different reform trends, this is assessed as the third most important.

A correlation test between the coordination tools and reforms (see Appendix, Table 5) shows that there are no significant negative correlations between hierarchy and the other coordination mechanisms. This might indicate that cross-cutting arrangements do not replace hierarchy, but tend to operate in the shadow of hierarchy (Pollitt 2003). There is, however, a significant positive correlation between establishing cross-cutting work and project groups, setting up cross-cutting policy arrangements and programs and also more permanent special purpose bodies (Pearson's R .24-.39, sig .001). Generally, the impact of collaboration and cooperation reforms does not vary significantly with these specific coordination mechanisms, except for setting up more permanent special purpose bodies (Pearson's R .11, sig .05).

8. Variations in perceptions of coordination quality

We now turn to the question of how to explain the variation in coordination experiences along the five forms of coordination and the perceived impact of policy coherence and coordination reforms. How do

⁴ Here, the designations "tend to agree" and "tend to disagree" refer to categories based on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, where the percentage shares for scale numbers 1, 2 and 3 (vs. 5, 6 and 7) are added and interpreted as tend to disagree (vs. tend to agree).

the scores on the different independent variables, i.e. coordination reforms and tools, structural, cultural and demographic features, correlate with the different dimensions of coordination? First, we present the bivariate relations between each set of independent variables and dependent variables. Next, we do a multivariate analysis of the relative importance of the various independent variables for the different dimensions of coordination.

Descriptive analysis

Coordination tools and reforms

Our analysis shows that the importance of collaboration and cooperation reforms tends to affect all coordination dimensions, except coordination with international and supra-national bodies. The effects of such reforms seem to be somewhat stronger on horizontal coordination, coordination with local and regional bodies as well as on policy coherence and coordination. The more specific coordination tools also seem to make a difference. Setting up cross-cutting work and project groups seems to have a positive influence on coordination with international and societal bodies. Establishing cross-cutting policy arrangements and programs seems to enhance horizontal coordination with regional and local government, coordination with other stakeholders in society and also policy coherence and coordination. The establishment of special purpose bodies correlates positively with coordination with local and regional bodies only. Referring issues upwards in the hierarchy seems to have a negative effect on coordinating with local and regional bodies and also on policy coherence and coordination.

Structural features

Structural features also affect coordination. Administrative executives in ministries have more positive experiences with both vertical and horizontal coordination as well as with coordination with international bodies. The same relationship is revealed when we look at the respondent's position. Executives in higher positions are more satisfied with horizontal and vertical coordination, as well as with policy coherence performance than those in lower positions. Executives in more 'wicked areas' like employment, health and environment report better coordination with the local and regional levels but worse coordination with international bodies. Organizational size seems to have a positive impact on coordination only with local and regional bodies.

Cultural features

With regard to cultural features, the role expectation "getting public organizations to work together" correlates positively with all coordination dimensions except with international and supra-national bodies. This means that those who agree that getting public organizations to work together is important also generally agree that coordination is good.

Demographic features

Overall, few of the correlations with democratic features are statistically significant. Whether the executives are jurists or economists does not seem to matter. The category “social scientists” correlates positively with horizontal coordination and also policy coherence and coordination. Age and tenure interact positively with horizontal coordination and coordination with the local and regional levels, whereas gender has a weak correlation with horizontal coordination, meaning that women are somewhat more positive about it.

Table 4: Bivariate correlations between independent and dependent variables. Pearson’s R.

	Vertical coordination	Horizontal coordination	Coordination local/regional government	International coordination	Societal coordination	Policy coherence and coordination
<i>Coordination reform perspectives:</i>						
Refer issue upwards in hierarchy	0.03	0.07	-0.12*	0.10	0.02	-0.14*
Set up cross-cutting work/project group	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.21**	0.12*	0.05
Set up cross-cutting policy arrangement/program	0.10	0.18*	0.13*	0.08	0.13*	0.14*
Set up special purpose bodies (more permanent)	0.07	0.07	0.19**	-0.02	0.07	0.05
Decide on one lead organization	0.12*	0.17**	0.10	0.21**	0.04	0.14*
Importance of collaboration and cooperation reforms	0.12*	0.21**	0.21**	0.04	0.15*	0.19**
<i>Structural features:</i>						
Administrative level	0.19**	0.23**	0.01	0.16*	0.07	0.09
Position	-0.13*	-0.11*	-0.05	-0.07	-0.06	-0.11*
Wicked issue sectors	-0.05	-0.06	0.19**	-0.13*	-0.01	0.07
Organizational size	0.03	0.09	0.11*	0.02	-0.00	0.03
<i>Cultural features:</i>						
Role expectation – getting public org’s working together	0.11*	0.14*	0.12*	0.06	0.14*	0.15*
Role expectation – finding joint solutions	0.03	0.13*	0.11	0.05	0.09	0.17*
<i>Demographic features:</i>						
Age	0.05	0.11*	0.14*	0.03	0.03	0.00
Gender	0.09	-0.04*	0.04	-0.01	0.02	-0.04
Tenure in public sector	0.07	0.19**	0.12*	-0.00	-0.02	0.00
Jurists	-0.02	0.05	-0.05	0.07	0.04	-0.05
Economists	-0.01	0.05	-0.07	0.00	0.04	0.02
Political scientists/social scientists?	0.06	0.12*	0.09	0.03	-0.04	0.16*

The dependent variables range from 1 to 7.

* $p < 0.05$

** $p < 0.001$

Multivariate analysis

We now turn to the relative explanatory power of the different independent variables. Only the explanatory variables that yielded statistically significant results in the bivariate correlations are included in the multivariate analyses. We now turn to the relative explanatory power of the different independent variables. Only the explanatory variables that yielded statistically significant results in the bivariate correlations are included in the multivariate analyses. The multivariate analysis, summed up in Table 4, generally confirms the pattern revealed in the bivariate analysis.⁵ The most important explanatory variables are related to the coordination reform perspective. Collaboration and cooperation reforms seem to be especially important, but various cross-cutting work and project groups as well as cross-cutting policy arrangements and programs also seem to make a difference. It is also interesting to note that referring issues upwards in the hierarchy seems to have a negative impact on coordination with local and regional bodies and also on the impact of policy coherence and coordination. This might indicate that coordination by hierarchy is not very successful in handling multi-level challenges or dealing with policy coherence linked to wicked issues crossing different policy areas.

The structural variables also make a difference, especially regarding vertical and horizontal coordination. Administrative executives in ministries and higher-level executives, as well as public executives at the top level, have significantly more positive experiences with vertical and horizontal coordination. There is also a significant effect of wicked policy areas on coordination with local and regional bodies. The effect of cultural features is not significant when other variables are controlled for. The demographic variables also have rather weak explanatory power. Age and gender have no significant effects. Tenure has a positive impact on horizontal coordination, and social scientists have a more positive perception of policy coherence and coordination than other professions. Overall our independent variables do not seem to vary significantly with coordination with organized societal groups.

⁵ The pairwise correlations between the independent variables show low levels of covariation. Thus, the issue of colinearity is not a problem in the regressions (see Appendix Table 5). We checked the curves of the normal distributions on all dependent variables and concluded that skewed curves are not a problem in our data. Additionally, we ran tests on linearity between dependent and independent variables, tested for multicollinearity, normal distribution of residuals, model fit and heteroscedasticity. All these prerequisites and diagnostics for regression seem present in our data.

Table 5: Summary of multivariate regression analyses by structural, cultural and demographic features affecting different forms of coordination. Linear regression, beta coefficients.

	Vertical coordination	Horizontal coordination	Coordination local/regional government	International coordination	Societal coordination	Policy coherence and coordination
<i>Coordination reform perspectives:</i>						
Refer issue upwards in hierarchy	-	-	-0.13*	-	-	-0.15*
Set up cross-cutting work/project group	-	-	-	0.16*	0.07	-
Set up cross-cutting policy arrangement/program	-	0.04	0.11	-	0.08	0.11
Set up special purpose bodies (more permanent)	-	-	0.13*	-	-	-
Decide on one lead organization	0.08	0.07	-	0.17*	-	0.03
Importance of collaboration and cooperation reforms	0.13*	0.24**	0.14*	-	-0.10	0.11*
<i>Structural features:</i>						
Administrative level	0.18**	0.23**	-	0.12*	-	-
2 nd hierarchical level	-0.00	-0.15*	-	-	-	-0.01
3 rd hierarchical level	-0.13*	-0.12	-	-	-	-0.09
Wicked issue sectors	-	-	0.15*	-0.00	-	-
Organizational size	-	-	0.07	-	-	-
<i>Cultural features:</i>						
Role expectation – getting public org’s working together	0.01	0.00	0.06	-	0.10	0.01
Role expectation – finding joint solutions	-	-0.01	-	-	-	0.08
<i>Demographic features:</i>						

Age	-	0.05	0.07	-	-	-
Gender	-	-0.01	-	-	-	-
Tenure in public sector	-	0.15*	0.09	-	-	-
Political scientists/social scientists?		0.02	-	-	-	0.14*
R ²	0.0757	0.1736	0.1561	0.0872	0.0460	0.0986
Adjusted R ²	0.0598	0.1394	0.1289	0.0757	0.0345	0.0737
F Statistics	4.78	5.08	5.73	7.59	4.02	3,96
Significance if F	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0034	0.0001

Note: Only variables that have significant bivariate effects are included in the regression analyses. The dependent variables are on a scale from 1 to 7. For the position in hierarchy variable, the top hierarchical value serves as a reference category, whereas the other two values are made dummies. This is done to be able to explore the effects of this ordinal variable with 3 categories in multivariate regression analyses.

-Not included in the regression

*p < 0.05

** p < 0.001

Our model can only explain 17% of the total variation in the horizontal coordination dimensions and less for the other dimensions. This is a limitation, and might be explained by the complexity of the model and the fact that there are numerous variables included. Still, we are left with some significant and solid findings regarding the effect of individual independent variables and combinations of variables. Added to this we are more interested in the relative explanatory strength of the different variables than on the total explanatory power of the model.

9. Discussion

Our theoretical and analytical framework presupposed that the coordination reform perspective in the Norwegian civil service, together with the administrative structure, demographic factors and cultural features, would have an impact on perceptions of coordination quality. We have shown, first, that civil servants perceived quite a few coordination problems in the Norwegian civil service, but more along some dimensions than others. While civil servants tend to evaluate vertical coordination in their own policy area as pretty good, they identify more problems with horizontal coordination across policy areas, and also with vertical coordination downwards to the local and regional levels and upwards to the international level. Cross-sector coordination with actors and stakeholders in the private sector and civil society in Norway is also seen as rather poor. Second, the administrative executives have a rather mixed view of the development of policy coherence and coordination. While 42% report an improvement over the past five years, 39 % see no change and 20% have experienced a deterioration.

Third, compared with their counterparts in other European countries, the Norwegian administrative executives experience coordination quality more positively and also tend to see greater improvements.

Fourthly, the analysis demonstrates that Norway has a variety of coordination mechanisms. Even after several decades of intensive administrative reforms, driven by markets and network arrangements, hierarchy is still a major coordination mechanism. But cross-boundary arrangements are also quite popular. So, what we see is a development towards more network-based arrangements in the shadow of hierarchy. Compared to other European countries, hierarchy is a weaker coordinating mechanism. In Norway, collaboration and cooperation reforms have had quite a significant impact. These have involved the development of secondary structures of temporary and ad hoc cross-cutting work or project groups, but also to some extent cross-cutting policy arrangements or programs. Such arrangements have, however, not had a major impact on the quality of coordination. This might be linked to the fact that they are often short on resources, authority and strong governance tools. But we also see that referring cases upwards in the hierarchy is not a very successful tool either, when it comes to solving problems of coordination with other organizations.

Fifth, there is also a significant variation in top civil servants' experience of coordination, but less so for coordination with other societal actors. Perceptions of other coordination dimensions depend to some degree on the coordination reform tools used, and more on structural features than on cultural features. Thus, our findings do not support those of the Inquiry Commission into the July 22 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway, which explains coordination failures first and foremost as a cultural problem (NOU 2012:14). Our findings are more in line with the expert committee that assessed police operations in the aftermath of the terrorist attack, which identified structural features as central to improving coordination (NOU 2013:9). The most important factors for understanding variation in coordination quality in our analysis seem to be administrative level and the perceived impact of collaboration and cooperation reforms. These have made not only a formal but also a real difference to how ministries and subordinate bodies work in practice (see also Christensen and Læg Reid 2008b). Many more civil servants in ministries report that not only vertical coordination within their own policy area but also horizontal coordination between policy areas is better.

There is, however, no one-to-one relationship between reforms and coordination tools on the one hand and coordination quality on the other hand. It is puzzling that, although coordination is deemed important and different coordination instruments have been introduced, judgements about their impact or actual effect seem to be mixed (Læg Reid, Ramada-Liiv, Rykkja and Sarapuu 2013). "Getting public organizations to work together" and "collaboration and cooperation reforms" were listed among the most important role perceptions and reform trends, yet the evaluation of coordination was much more differentiated. Despite considerable attention to coordination issues, less than half of the respondents found that policy coherence and coordination in their own policy area had improved.

Table 5 summarizes the main expectations based on the four perspectives and compares them with the main results of the data analysis. Generally we see a mixed pattern. Some of the hypotheses are supported, but most of them are not. Even if we see effects of the different variables from the reform and the structural perspective, and also from the demographic perspective, the relationships are not necessarily consistent with the expectations. Comparing expectations and results yields an overall mixed picture. The results support the view that coordination represents hybrid and multi-dimensional efforts that combine reform initiatives and structural and demographic features.

Table 6: Main expectation and results

	Support
<i>Coordination reform perspective:</i>	
H1: The more important coordination reforms are the better coordination quality is	Yes
H2: Executives scoring high on hierarchical mechanisms also score high on vertical coordination	No
H3: Executives scoring high on cross-cutting arrangements will perceive better horizontal coordination quality	No
<i>Structural perspective:</i>	
H4: Subordinate bodies will have better coordination with users and societal stakeholders	No
H5: Ministerial executives will have better experiences with vertical coordination	Yes
H6: Top executives will score higher on coordination than managers	Yes
H7: Top civil servants will have better experiences regarding vertical coordination while managers' perceptions will be more related to societal effects.	No
H8: Executives working with 'wicked' issues will see more problems with horizontal coordination	Partly
H9: Administrative executives in small organizations will face fewer coordination problems than in bigger bodies	No
<i>Cultural perspective:</i>	
H10: Executives identifying with getting organizations to work together and to find joint solutions to solve problems of public concern will see fewer coordination problems.	No
<i>Demographic perspective:</i>	
H11: Older executives will have fewer coordination problems than younger	No
H12: Executives with long tenure will have fewer coordination problems than those with short tenure	Partly
H13: Men will experience fewer coordination problems than women	No

H14: Social scientists and economists will have fewer coordination problems than other professions	Partly No
H15: Jurists will generally see more coordination problems than other professions, except for vertical coordination	

10. Conclusion

Norwegian executives seem to find it rather difficult to evaluate the quality of coordination. The variation in their perceptions is linked both to the use of different coordinating tools and reforms and to structural features, but demographic characteristics also matter. Collaboration and coordination among different public-sector organizations has been an important reform trend over the past years. Nevertheless, it is rather difficult to reveal its actual effects on policy coherence and coordination. Coordination issues are important in the administrative executives' understanding of their own role, and they are also high on the reform agenda. Still, many executives face important coordination challenges, and the effects of the different reform measures on coordination are contested. Generally, the pattern is not very strong, and seems rather complex. The quality of coordination is better vertically, within national government bodies in the same policy area. Overall, coordination is assessed as rather poor, particularly horizontal coordination between bodies in different policy areas.

Our conclusion is that coordination challenges cannot be reduced to single-factor explanations. Coordination itself is a multi-dimensional concept, and we need to combine different explanatory factors to understand variation. This is partly due to the context dependency of coordination challenges. We have to go beyond the quest for coordination as a search for the philosopher's stone (Seidman 1970). There is no best solution or right formula for coordination that can harmonize competing interests, overcome uncertainty and ambiguous government structures and make hard policy choices that everyone will accept. Contemporary governmental systems are characterized by interdependencies and diversity, which puts strong pressure on multi-dimensional coordination issues.

The coordination landscape seems to be a mixture of Old Public Administration and post-NPM instruments, illustrated by the fact that hierarchy is a strong coordination mechanism alongside cross-cutting partnerships. The different coordinating mechanisms seem to supplement rather than replace each other. This means that we face an interesting combination of robustness and flexibility in the coordination landscape in central government. Attempts to enhance coordination in an increasingly complex governmental system might also have a negative impact on the capacity of governments to enforce accountability (Peters 2006). A main result is that coordination seems to be problematic, probably reflecting the fact that coordination is a demanding exercise involving many actors with partly differing interests and resources but also that NPM, even in Norway, might have created increased coordination problems especially along the horizontal dimension.

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Appendix:

Table 1: Descriptions of the dependent variables.

	Mean	Standard deviation	N=100%
National government bodies within the same policy area	4.72	1.22	408
National government bodies from different policy areas	4.11	1.20	385
National and local/regional government bodies	3.95	1.36	332
National and supra-national bodies/international organizations	4.17	1.43	344
Government bodies and private and voluntary sector stakeholders	4.08	1.36	374
Policy coherence and coordination	4.29	1.02	380

Note: All variables range from 1 to 7, where 1 means very poor and 7 means very good. "Do not know" is excluded from the table.

Table 2: Public servants' characterization of coordination within their own policy field, percentages for each value. Dependent variables 1-5.

	Vertical coordination	Horizontal coordination	Coordination local/regional government	International coordination	Societal coordination
Very poor	1.2	0.8	5.1	2.9	2.9
2	3.7	7.8	9.6	11.3	11.5
3	8.8	22.3	19.6	16.0	17.4
4	26.2	32.0	29.5	27.6	27.5
5	33.3	25.2	24.7	24.1	26.2
6	21.6	9.9	9.3	13.7	12.0
Very good	5.2	2.1	2.1	4.4	2.4
N	408	385	332	344	374

Table 3: Public servant' rating of the way public administration has performed on policy coherence and coordination. Percentages.

	Policy coherence and coordination
Deteriorated significantly	0.5
2	4.0
3	15.0
4	38.7
5	31.1
6	10.3
Improved significantly	0.5
N	380

Table 4: Parwise correlation between dependent variables.

	Vertical coordination	Horizontal coordination	Coordination local/regional gov't	International coordination	Societal coordination	Policy coherence performance
Vertical coordination	1.00					
Horizontal coordination	0.57**	1.00				
Coordination local/regional gov't	0.30**	0.42**	1.00			
Societal coordination	0.36**	0.36**	0.41**	0.51**	1.00	
Policy coherence performance	0.24**	0.25**	0.17*	0.17*	0.17*	1.00

The independent variables:

Refer issue up hierarchy: (1) Strongly disagree, (7) Strongly agree;

Special purpose bodies: (1) Strongly disagree, (7) Strongly agree;

Cross-cutting work group: (1) Strongly disagree, (7) Strongly agree;

Cross-cutting policy arrangement: (1) Strongly disagree, (7) Strongly agree;

Intra-sectorial collaboration reform: (1) Not at all, (7) To a large extent;

Administrative level: (0) Other administrative levels, (1) Ministry;

Wicked issue sectors: (0) No, (1) Yes;

Position: (1) Top hierarchical level in organization, (2) Second hierarchical level in organization, (3) Third hierarchical level in organization;

Organization size: (1) fewer than 50 employees, (2) 50–99, (3) 100–499, (4) 500–999, (5) 1000–5000, (6) over 5000 employees;

Organization collaboration: (1) Strongly disagree, (7) Strongly agree; Joint Solutions: (1) Strongly

disagree, (7) Strongly agree;

Age: (1) 35 years or less, (2) 36–45, (3) 46–55, (4) 56–65, (5) 66 or older;

Gender: (0) male (1) female;

Tenure: (1) less than 1 year, (2) 1–5 years, (3) 5–10 years, (4) 10–20 years, (5) More than 20 years;

Jurist: (0) No, (1) Yes;

Economist: (0) No, (1) Yes;

Political scientist (0) No, (1) Yes.

Table 5: Pairwise correlations

	Refer issue upward s	Special pur. body	Cross- cut. w.grou p	Cross- cut. policy arr.	Decide on lead organiz ation	Imp. coll & coop reform	Adm. level	Positio n	Org. size	Wicked iss sect.	Org. collabo ration	Joint. solutio ns	Age	Gender	Tenure	Jurists	Econo mists
Special pur. body	0.08	1.00															
Cross-cut. w.group	0.05	0.24 **	1.00														
Cross-cut policy arr.	0.03	0.27 **	0.39 **	1.00													
Decide on lead organization	-0.04	-0.35 **	0.27 **	0.43 **	1.00												
Imp. coll & coop reform	-0.07	0.11 *	0.03	0.09	0.19 **	1.00											
Adm. level	0.02	-0.05	0.08	0.38 **	0.05	-0.18 **	1.00										
Position	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.06	-0.07	-0.07	0.06	1.00									
Org. size	0.04	0.07	0.03	-0.08	0.08	0.01	-0.11 *	-0.14 *	1.00								
Wicked issue sector	-0.04	0.13	0.07	-0.09	0.02	0.12 *	-0.27 **	0.06	0.14 *	1.00							

Org. collaboration	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.13	0.18	0.29	0.07	-0.11	0.11	0.01	1.00						
				*	**	**		*	*								
Joint solutions	-0.02	0.21	0.06	0.12	0.25	0.22	0.09	-0.06	0.13	0.15	0.44	1.00					
		**		*	**	**			*	*	**						
Age	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.06	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.19	0.01	0.06	0.00	-0.03	1.00				
								**									
Gender	0.07	-0.04	0.09	0.02	-0.08	0.03	-0.02	0.14	-0.00	0.09	0.03	0.04	-0.08	1.00			
								*									
Tenure	-0.09	-0.08	0.04	0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.15	-0.09	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.47	-0.09	1.00		
							*						**				
Jurists	0.01	-0.04	-0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.07	-0.18	-0.03	-0.08	-0.10	-0.03	0.01	-0.05	0.13	0.04	1.00	
							**						*				
Economists	0.10	-0.04	-0.16	-0.09	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07	-0.08	0.13	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.11	-0.01	-0.20	1.00
	*		*						*				*		**		
Pol. scientists	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.16	0.06	-0.03	-0.04	0.15	0.04	-0.10	-0.16*	0.10*	-0.17	-0.17
							*				*					**	**

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