Coordination practice
COORDINATING FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND SAFETY IN NORWAY
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This coordination practice describes the main structure and function of central coordinative arrangements for crisis management in Norway and includes facts on changes in this structure over the last ten years. Coordination is a central challenge for government authorities responsible for crisis management, civil protection and internal security and safety. Major crises normally demand coordination across organisational borders and policy areas, both at strategic and operative levels. Coordination is also a major challenge for the Norwegian government in general, mainly due to a tradition of ministerial rule and a strong local government tradition, resulting in both vertical and horizontal coordination problems. The case description particularly emphasises organisational changes in central government arrangements for crisis management after the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011.
Preface

This coordination practice is a result of research within COCOPS Work Package 5: The Governance of Social Cohesion: Innovative Coordination Practices in Public Management.

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The COCOPS project (Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future) seeks to comparatively and quantitatively assess the impact of New Public Management style reforms in European countries, drawing on a team of European public administration scholars from 11 universities in 10 countries.

The specific objectives of Work Package 5 are:

- To search and identify emerging coordination practices and related steering instruments in public management in European public sectors.
- To compile a case study catalogue of such coordination practices with direct utility to public managers and the research community.
- To analyse the functioning of such coordination practices and to assess their value in countering public sector fragmentation and delivering public value.

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### 1. THE COORDINATION LANDSCAPE

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Main country characteristics: NORWAY</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>General political-administrative structure</strong></td>
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<td>Norway is a parliamentary democracy, and a unitary state with 5 million inhabitants. The country has a multi-party system that results in coalition governments or a single party coming into power. As in most European countries there are three administrative levels: a national level (central government), a regional level (19 counties) and a local level (429 municipalities).</td>
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The Norwegian central government consists of 18 different ministries, including the Prime Minister’s Office. A ministry works as a secretariat for the political staff, manages agencies and is responsible for administrative tasks within its portfolio. The ministries at the central level are relatively small. Agencies report to different ministries and are located outside the ministries. The number of ministries has remained largely the same since the 1980s. In 2009, the ministries employed only a small percentage of the total number of civil servants (about 4300). About 159,000 civil servants were employed by state agencies at both the central and local levels.

Individual ministerial responsibility is a core principle within the Norwegian system. The minister bears the ultimate responsibility for actions within that ministry, including those of subordinate agencies. This implies strong sector ministries and vertical coordination, resulting in a corresponding weaker horizontal coordination between policy areas. It also means that coordination by hierarchy within separate sectors generally dominates over both network- and market-type mechanisms. Specialisation by purpose is a dominant principle, making it difficult to establish coordinative arrangements across sectors. Consequently, sector ministries have been substantially stronger than ministries responsible for sector-crossing activities and coordination (with the exception of the Ministry of Finance). This indicates that ministries operate as separate “silos” with limited ability to apprehend cross-cutting policy issues.

Another central feature of the Norwegian polity is the principle of local self-government. Local democracy and authority is a relatively strong value. Following the expansion of the welfare state after World War II, local authorities became responsible for providing a broad range of services. Greater municipal responsibility also meant a closer integration across government levels, and until 1992 a sectorised organisation mirroring central government institutions).

A series of reforms aimed at municipal devolution was implemented from the 1980s on and culminated in the Municipal Act of 1992. The new legislation aimed at joined-up (non-sectorial) government structures at the municipal level in order to counter the strong sectorisation of Norwegian public government and the centralising forces that allegedly reduced local-
government autonomy. Whether or not the reforms succeeded, is still debated.

| Coordination discourse | Coordination is a central theme in Norwegian public policy and administration, within central administration, at other administrative levels and within specific policy areas. Norway has seen several large reforms over the last few years aiming to deal with problems associated with increasing specialisation and institutional fragmentation in the public sector, and with what has been called “wicked”, cross-cutting policy problems that cross organisational boundaries and administrative levels. A large welfare reform (the NAV reform), a hospital reform, a coordination reform in the health sector, and a pensions reform are recent examples of new initiatives to improve coordination within the public sector in Norway. Typical initiatives have been the restructuring of existing agencies or the establishment of new ones, and increasing management by objectives and results. After the terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya in 2011, there has been increasing debate concerning coordination for crisis management and internal security and safety. Coordination is also a central theme within other policy areas, such as environmental protection and climate change.

The reforms aim at better coordination both within the horizontal and the vertical dimensions. They are aimed at strengthening the steering capacity of the state and its administration, to improve effectiveness, efficiency and service delivery. Finding a balance between territorial and sectoral specialisation and between coordination by hierarchy and by networks is a constant challenge. The reform initiatives range from large institutional mergers and coordination of services and administrative systems across levels and sectors, to the establishment of more informal networks and arrangements within or between different organisations in singular sectors. However, the high ambitions of many such reforms have been modified or partly reversed over time. |

| Policy area | The policy field of internal security and safety has, since the end of the cold war, been given extensive attention by government commissions, official documents and reports, but has been seen as suffering from a fragmented organisation, ridden with coordination problems and with few, incremental and largely crisis-driven, changes taking place. After two devastating terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya island on 22 July 2011, the government’s responsibility for crisis management and internal security and safety has been heavily debated, and important adjustments in government arrangements for preparedness and crisis management were introduced.

A crucial concern relating to coordination at the central level has been the question of who takes the lead, both in crisis management and general preparedness. Related to these concerns has been the question of overall oversight, steering and control within the policy area.

Since the 1990s, three crucial organising principles have guided the government’s work for internal security and safety: a principle of liability, a |
principle of decentralisation and a principle of conformity. A fourth principle, the principle of cooperation, was introduced after the terrorist attacks in 2011.

The liability principle implies that all ministries and other government authorities are responsible for internal security and safety within their own sectors or areas of competence. This is closely related to the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility, emphasising strong sector ministries. The fragmented solution makes the Ministry of Justice’s responsibility for horizontal coordination particularly challenging, also enhanced by the strong sectorisation of Norwegian central government. The principle of liability is further modified by extensive civil-military cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and its subordinate bodies.

The decentralisation (or subsidiarity) principle emphasises that a crisis should be managed at the lowest operational level possible. This corresponds to the dominant doctrine of local self-government and authority. Consequently, the 19 county governors and 429 municipalities are given important functions. The county governors operate as mediators between sector interests as well as state and local-level administration at the regional level, and have important coordinating responsibilities in a crisis. Traditionally, the Norwegian municipalities have enjoyed widespread autonomy within the field of civil protection. Territory is therefore an important additional specialisation principle within the Norwegian political-administrative system. The municipalities were granted a general legal obligation for preparedness in 2010, emphasising the responsibility for risk and vulnerability analysis and preparedness through training, exercise and planning.

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (renamed in 2011) is responsible for ensuring security and safety in society and of individual citizens, and manages central agencies within the policy area of internal security and safety. It is also the top coordinating authority and lead department in a national crisis situation within the civil sector. The ministry manages the Police Directorate, the Police Security Services, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre and the Directorate for Emergency Communication. This implies one line of authority to the police, and another line of authority to the Civil Defence and the county governors in the 19 counties of Norway. The other ministries within the Norwegian government are responsible for preparedness and crisis management within their own areas of competence and have their own agencies and authorities with tasks within the field, such as the Food Safety Authority, the Water Resources and Energy Directorate, the Climate and Pollution Agency. The National Security Authority has a special position since it sorts under the Ministry of Defence but also reports to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice has an important coordinative role whereas it retains overall responsibility for the supervision of the other ministries’ work within the field of internal
security and safety.
A public commission, the “Vulnerability Commission”, was set up in 1999 to analyse and propose efforts to reduce the vulnerability of society and improve safety, security and civil protection. One of its central conclusions was that the policy area was highly fragmented, resulting in ambiguity and accountability concerns. It recommended the establishment of a new Ministry of Internal Security and Safety responsible for central crisis management and civil protection, and a further strengthening of central administrative arrangements, through the establishment of a crisis council and a crisis support group. The proposal to establish a new ministry turned out too controversial. The result was instead a strengthening of existing structures, through a merger of existing units and agencies and the establishment of new ones. Existing principles and doctrines of public organisation and management within the field were thereby confirmed.

In order to cope with the continuing coordination problems within the field, last pointed out by the 22 July Commission, the government follow-up to the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011, introduced a principle of cooperation. Thus, all relevant actors within the field are responsible for optimal cooperation with others in order to ensure adequate levels of prevention, preparedness and crisis management. At the same time, the government made it clear that the new principle should not alter the leading principle of ministerial and constitutional responsibility. The terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011 have therefore not resulted in any major institutional changes so far.

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2. COORDINATION PRACTICE: Coordinating for internal security and safety in Norway

2.1. Substance

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Norway</th>
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<td>Area</td>
<td>Central Government</td>
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Main characteristics
Over the years, several efforts to reach better coordination within the field of crisis management, internal security and safety in Norway have been launched, whereas government reports repeatedly have pointed to governance problems related to a fragmented structure. Many public authorities in different sectors and at different administrative levels have important tasks and responsibilities in a crisis. The field is frequently described as disunited or fragmented, resulting in major coordination problems, overlaps, grey areas and problems related to communication, competence and liability, and difficulties in providing adequate solutions concerning prevention, preparedness and effective crisis management. Getting responsible authorities to cooperate and reach optimal
coordination is a constant challenge within this policy field.

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security takes on a lead coordinative role in major crises. Over the last twenty years, several initiatives to strengthen the ministry’s coordination capacity have been put forward. Here, we will focus on the establishment and function of two specific organisations set up to foster better coordination in crisis and preparedness: The Government Emergency Management Council (GEMC) and the Government Emergency Support Unit (GESU).

The Government established a Cabinet Crisis Council, later named the Government Emergency Management Council and a Crisis Support Group, later named the Government Emergency Support Unit, in 2006. Both arrangements were proposed in earlier documents and official reports, but were only realised after experiences with and criticism of the crisis management during and after the Tsunami on Boxing day in South East Asia in 2004. Many Norwegians died or were otherwise affected by this crisis.

After the terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya island in 2011, the capacity and preparedness of the Ministry of Justice in crisis situations came to be heavily debated. Criticism was based on several critical internal evaluations, and the report of a specially appointed commission investigating the incidents of 22 July: The 22 July Commission. A new coordination resolution was launched in 2012 to clarify the ministry’s role and responsibilities. It recognised the ministry’s lead role and coordination responsibilities in civil national crises, and urged for a stronger coordination through a strengthening of its supervision of other ministries’ responsibility for preparedness and crisis management, a strengthening of management by objectives and results, and a stronger regime for training and emergency exercises and simulations. Further measures were launched in a government white paper in 2012 and more are expected in the wake of the 22 July Commission report.

The terrorist attacks put the functioning of the GEMC and the GESU to the test, and rearrangements within central crisis-management structures followed. The coordination resolution established that the Ministry of Justice should take the lead in all national crises unless decided otherwise. The former Cabinet Crisis Council was renamed to avoid confusion since the council has a purely administrative and not a political function. The GESU was made permanent and operative twenty-four hours a day and strengthened with more personnel and resources. It was also made responsible for a new Civil Situation Centre with designated office facilities and technical equipment, set up to monitor incidents, crises and exercises within the civil sector. The Civil Situation Centre corresponds to two other similar situation centres, one under the Ministry of Defence and one under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The main function of the GEMC is to provide advice on which ministry should take the lead in a crisis, ensure coordination at the central level and
provide coordinated information to the public. It is summoned in crises that are particularly demanding and complex – more particularly when a crisis hits nationally and/or more sectors at the same time. It is also operative in certain major exercises and field drills, for example the NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CMX). It consists of five permanent members: the Secretary Generals from the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It may be expanded with participants at the same administrative level from other ministries if the situation calls for it. In certain situations, such as during the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011, representatives from all 18 ministries may participate.

The GESU was established to provide administrative support to whichever ministry or department is in the lead in a crisis situation, and to provide running support to all ministries on issues relating to crisis management and internal security and safety in a normal situation. It has offices within the main Government complex in Oslo. It was originally staffed with 6-8 people on a permanent basis, with an option to expand the group upon need. Personnel-wise, it was strengthened after 22 July. The GESU originally sorted under the Ministry of Justice’s department for rescue and preparedness. After 22 July, the GESU reports directly to the secretary general within the ministry, and (since 2013) has been placed within a new department of crisis management and security. The GESU also has the role of being the permanent secretariat for the GEMC.

**Background and initiation of the practice**

Internal security and safety in Norway is characterised by an extensive division of responsibility and specialisation, and has been described as fragmented. From the early 1990s on and into the 2000s, several government-initiated commissions and reports have emphasised the need for stronger and better coordination.

The disunity of the field is related to the establishment of the main organising principles for crisis management: the principle of liability, the principle of decentralisation and the principle of conformity. These may be difficult to follow in many crises, and likely even more so in crosscutting or particularly severe crises. Crises that hit more than one sector at the same time challenge the principle of liability. The principle of decentralisation can be problematic in crises that need more central coordination and leadership. The principle of conformity may be difficult to follow in crises that demand more flexible solutions or improvisation. The principle of cooperation has been applied within the rescue operations for a long time and was introduced in 2012 as a general principle for all crisis situations and relevant actors within the field. However, it is still unclear how this should be implemented in practice.

The establishment of the GEMC and the GESU was first proposed by the Vulnerability Commission in 2000 and also recommended in following government white papers. However, the proposal was not followed through until after the Tsunami disaster in 2004. The crisis spurred massive...
criticism towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the capacity and actions of central government and the Ministry of Justice in terms of preparedness and crisis management.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>The GEMC and the GESU were originally proposed in 2000 by a government appointed commission – The Vulnerability Commission – but was not established until 2006. The Tsunami crisis in 2004 spurred its implementation. Both are permanent organisations. After 22 July 2011, further measures to strengthen the coordinative capacity of central government and the Ministry of Justice in particular, have been launched. However, this is an on-going process and further changes may take place.</th>
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2.2. Structure and actors

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<th>Basic features</th>
<th>The GEMC was established as a temporary organisation under the Ministry of Justice, in order to support the ministry’s coordinative functions in civil crises. It is summoned in more severe crises that require some kind of national coordination. According to the principle of liability, the ministry that is the most affected by the crisis should take the lead. The Ministry of Justice takes the lead in crises that are considered a national crisis, or when the crisis does not clearly fall within any other single sector. Experience has shown that this arrangement has its drawbacks, and a clarification of the principle was suggested after 22 July, resulting in the coordination resolution mentioned above. In a national crisis the GEMC functions as the superior administrative coordinating body and is responsible for coordinating measures across the relevant ministries. The constitutional and ministerial responsibility still rests within each ministry. The main tasks of the GEMC is to ensure coordinated strategic decisions, to establish which ministry should take the lead, to ensure the coordination of measures that are initiated by different sectors, to ensure coordinated information to the public and the media and to ensure that questions that require decisions at the political level are put before the political leaders or Government at the necessary speed. The GEMC normally meets during more severe crises and when larger simulations or field drills are initiated. It also meets regularly to discuss overarching challenges within the field, and to assess relevant incidents or experiences from exercises or field drills. The GESU is formally organised under the Ministry of Justice, but supports whichever ministry takes the lead in a crisis. After 2011, it has been staffed 24/7 and functions as the permanent secretariat for the GEMC. Its main functions are to provide administrative support to central government, to provide competence in strategic crisis management, and to give infrastructure capacity (technical support and premises) in crisis situations. It also supports the Ministry of Justice’s coordinative role by participating</th>
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in exercises/simulations and providing general advice and guidance on crisis management to central government.

Until 22 July 2011, the GEMC and the GESU did not have experience with more serious events. The terrorist attacks in 2011 put both of them under extreme pressure. Both played a crucial role during the crisis, but did not operate fully according to original intentions, and capacity shortcomings were clearly revealed. The Ministry of Justice was supposed to take the lead in the crisis, but was itself hit by the first attack. Therefore, the ministry leaned heavily on the GESU for central crisis management. This meant that the GESU to some extent took care of central crisis-management tasks that should have been dealt with by the ministry itself, and possibly also on a higher administrative level. A clarification of the ministry’s roles, its responsibility for crisis management within its own sector and its role as the lead department with subsequent overall strategic crisis-management tasks were highlighted as important learning points. Capacity, competence and adequate planning were central keywords in the follow-up and evaluations. Also, it became clear that the GESU needed a strengthening in order to fulfil its responsibilities in a crisis of similar magnitude.

According to the latest government white paper on societal security and safety (St. meld 29 2011-2012), the GEMC should meet more frequently and engage in exercises more often. A major budget increase for the GESU to support the GEMC and the Ministry of Justice was proposed in 2012.

Further measures were proposed to strengthen central crisis coordination. This includes the establishment of the Civil Situation Centre within the ministry. There have also been further organisational changes, whereas the GESU from 2013 sorts under a new department for crisis management and security within the ministry.

Main tools

Both the GEMC and the GESU are imperative organisations set up to ensure horizontal coordination within the field of internal security and safety. Especially the GESU has been strengthened after 22 July.

The GEMC can make certain strategic decisions regarding leadership in crisis, and can request resources or specific assistance in a crisis situation. The GESU is an important administrative support for the different Ministries in a crisis situation and in the work for adequate preparedness. Still, the relevant Ministries and their underlying authorities are responsible within their own fields of competence and according to the principles of liability, decentralisation and conformity. Thus, planning, capacity, training and competence within each individual ministry and within the responsible authorities at different administrative levels, are crucial resources.

Within each sector there is a line of responsibility from the ministry to responsible agencies. Here, coordination is largely based on hierarchy. Horizontal coordination, i.e. between organisations and authorities at the
same level, is more typically based on less formalised structures of cooperation and carried out in a more ad-hoc fashion.

After a crisis, budgets are often increased. There is more money and more attention to the necessity of coordination. The coordinative functions and responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice have been strengthened through internal reorganisation and the strengthening of the GESU.

**Main actors**

The GEMC comprises centrally placed civil servants at a higher administrative level, i.e. the Secretary Generals within the Prime Ministers Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In certain crisis situations, civil servants from other ministries may be included. In particular severe crises, all Ministries can be represented.

The GESU is a permanent administrative resource staffed by competent civil servants within the Ministry of Justice. Like the GEMC, it is expanded upon need.

Most of the changes following after 2011 have been introduced internally, i.e. by the Ministry of Justice and Preparedness. There has been a major public debate on issues related to preparedness, prevention and crisis management following 22 July. However, there have been no large-scale restructurings of the field yet.

**2.3. Impacts and effects**

The coordination problems within the field of internal security and safety reflect general coordination problems within the Norwegian central government. These are largely related to the structure and traditions of the Norwegian state and should be seen within the country context. The principle of constitutional ministerial responsibility results in an organisation based on a sector that tends to hinder horizontal coordination. Coordination is largely vertical and hierarchical. This results in rather weak horizontal coordinative arrangements. Horizontal coordination is often based on ad-hoc, temporary or more loosely coupled organisational arrangements such as networks, boards and collegial bodies, largely without resources, authority and steering instruments and in the shadow of hierarchy. Within the area of internal security and safety, experiences with crises tend to evoke new discussions on problems within the field related to increasing fragmentation, divided liabilities and lack of risk awareness and focus on preparedness and crisis management.

A major motivation behind the introduction of the GEMC and the GESU was to gain public confidence and trust in central-government crisis management and its ability to tackle crises. Through the experience with crises, among them the Pandemic Swine Flu in 2009 and the attacks of 22 July 2011, the GEMC and the GESU have gained important experience. Overall the establishment of the GEMC and the GESU has resulted in more
capacity to act for central administrative and political leaders in a crisis situation. The GEMC provides for necessary coordination between central actors in certain severe crises and should be an important source of support for the State Secretaries and Ministers involved. The GESU provides important competence and expertise, in addition to technical equipment and physical arrangements, and it is envisaged for the GESU to play a more important role in normal situations and in the running tasks related to preparedness and crisis management, as well.

At the same time, experience with crises – and especially 22 July – has exposed important shortcomings and problems with the overall central-government structure for crisis management. The 22 July Commission pointed towards a lack of adequate risk awareness, preparedness and action capacity, deficient planning, coordination and communication, as well as problems related to liability. The policy field has been given low priority, although the Commission stated that the problem was more due to lacking leadership and culture than a lack of resources. Also, it became clear that the GEMC and GESU needed more training, improved systems and plans for crisis management, as well as a more permanent structure. This criticism has so far resulted in some efforts to strengthen preparedness and coordination capacity at the central level. However these changes have – thus far – been incremental and stepwise rather than all embracing.

A conclusion is that there is a consensus when it comes to diagnosing the problems, broadly identified as fragmentation, pulverisation of accountability and weak coordination arrangements. However, the suggested solutions are beset with ambiguity and conflicts, and there is a mismatch between problems and available solutions. The result is a gradual upgrading of the Ministry of Justice and related coordinative arrangements, without challenging fundamental principles of ministerial and constitutional responsibility. Until now, coordination by hierarchy has taken priority, although it is increasingly supplemented by coordination through networks in the shadow of hierarchy.

2.4. Lessons learned and policy recommendations

The central government structure for crisis management and for tackling important responsibilities concerning internal security and safety was put to the test with the terrorist attacks in July 2011. The GEMC and the GESU had been proposed in several white papers and government reports, but were not set up until after the experience with the Tsunami in 2004 – where the crisis management abilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice were put to the test. The terrorist attacks in 2011 exposed further shortcomings and gave important experience in order to improve these structures.

Experience has shown that adequate training, resources, staffing and
equipment, as well as attention towards crisis management and preparedness, are crucial in order to handle major national crises. At the same time, prioritising resources for crisis management and preparedness is difficult since major crises are largely unpredictable and uncertain events. Rising complexity in society, increasing vulnerability, and more transboundary crises enhance these problems.

The coordination of resources and different authorities with liabilities within this policy field is a constant challenge. An internal reorganisation and clarification of responsibilities is expected to strengthen the coordination and driving-force capacity of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The establishment and strengthening of the GEMC and the GESU are also important developments. There are also further actions and reforms underway, such as plans for a police reform, a strengthening of the Police Security Services and the improvement of existing systems of supervision, control, training and exercise, and systems for communication and emergency response. Whether these changes will result in actual strengthened capacity remains to be seen.

The crisis management of the terrorist attacks demonstrates that the established organisational principles of conformity, liability and decentralisation are difficult to practice. The principle of liability establishes responsibility within single organisations, but represents an obstacle to coordination in more severe crisis situations. The line ministries carry important responsibilities for crisis management and remain strong. Responsibility is also distributed among a great number of public organisations at different administrative levels and with overlapping geographical boundaries. In transboundary crises, this fragmented structure creates action capacity problems.

Major crises and disasters are largely unexpected and surprising situations, where established organisational forms often prove inadequate. Generally, there is an urgent need for improvisation and rapid and flexible response. Often, established hierarchical structures, chains of command and competence areas are overstepped. In order to meet such situations, there is a need for flexibility. This counters a continuous focus on planning and an organising principle based on conformity or similarity.

It is still somewhat unclear how the principle of cooperation that was introduced after 22 July will be implemented. It will probably need to be defined more precisely before one can actually evaluate its use. A strengthening of the GEMC and the GESU at the central level has been vital, considering the experience of 22 July. However, one cannot know what the next crisis entails, and there will always be an element of uncertainty of where, when and how the next crisis hits.

Crisis management in the face of severe, complex and crosscutting national crises is particularly difficult. Adequate preparedness requires sound risk awareness as well as adequate training, planning, supervision, auditing and control. Low probability and high impact characterise the policy field, and
this creates particular challenges. Coordinative mechanisms in crisis management are crucial. They seem more stable when they are permanent, provided with necessary resources and training, and when plans and procedures are tested in realistic exercises or situations. Central coordinative capacity is also important. There is a need for focused attention as well as central leadership. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that there are no universal solutions. We are faced with problems that are very difficult to predict. Crises are, by definition, often complex, crosscutting and unforeseeable incidents that are difficult to handle.

2.5. **Further information**

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<tr>
<th>Data and references</th>
<th>The information here is partly based on research done in a project on “Multilevel Governance and Civil Protection: The Tension between Sector and Territorial Specialisation” financed by the Norwegian Research Council from 2006 to 2010. Publications in English from the project are included below. The information is also based on an analysis of central policy documents available from the Norwegian Government: <a href="http://www.regjeringen.no">www.regjeringen.no</a>. Most of these are only in Norwegian.</th>
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